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1 Technocratic Versus Democratic
Debates over the methods of collective environmental decision-
making (CEDM) have been centered by the „technocratic-
democratic‟ divide. On the technocratic side, emphasis is on the 
correctness of environmental decisions in respect of certain criteria 
of the „truth‟. The high level of complexity and uncertainty of 
environmental issues provides an epistemic reason for specializing 
decision-making by individuals with sufficiently high competence 
(experts). On the democratic side, emphasis is on the legitimacy of 
environmental decisions in respect of certain procedural
considerations, such as inclusion, equality and rationality. The 
extensive coverage of the impact of environmental decisions 
provides a procedural reason for democratizing decision-making 
by every citizen (laymen). To reconcile the divide, experts and 
laymen may complement each other, forming a system of 
distributed cognition. This project offers a philosophical 
foundation of such idea.
2 Meeting Procedural Requirements
Suppose Peter, Paul and Mary are making an environmental 
decision, through majority voting, based on the following inter-
connected propositions: 
1. “There is pollution in X” (premise, a); 
2. “If there is pollution in X, then pollution control policy 
should be introduced in X” (premise, b); and 
3. “Pollution control policy should be introduced in X” 
(conclusion, c).  
a b c
Peter   
Paul   
Mary   
Majority   
3 Boosting Epistemic Performance 
Then, how may the judgmental power among individuals with 
different competences be distributed across the premises, so as to 
enhance the chance of making correct decisions? Suppose, for a, 
Peter‟s competence in being correct is 0.7, while that of Paul and 
that of Mary are both 0.55. For b, the competences are 0.6 for 
Peter, Paul and Mary. A distributed-cognitive system may assign 
Peter, an expert in judging a, to specialize on such proposition 
while retaining a democratic arrangement on b, such that the 
probabilities of correct judgments on a and b are both enhanced. 
Table 2 compares the performances by different procedures.
To avoid such irrational outcomes, either condition (1) or (2) must 
be relaxed. Yet, the procedure will become undemocratic. 
Alternatively, the collectively judgment on conclusion (c) can be 
decided by focusing solely on either: (i) premises (a) and (b); or (ii) 
conclusion (c) itself.
Claim 1. In CEDM, if collective judgments on both 
conclusion and its supporting reason(s), or 
premise(s), are expected, such that, say, any 
collective decisions can be justified to future 
generations, then (i) is more desirable.
Table 1 above shows that the collective judgments are inconsistent 
under the reasonable conditions of democracy, namely (1) 
inclusion of all consistent inputs; and (2) majority voting        
decision procedure.
Judgmental Power Distribution a b
Peter only on a and b (technocratic) 0.7 0.6
Everyone on a and b through majority voting
(democratic)
0.649 0.648
Peter specializing on a and everyone on b
through majority voting (distributed-
cognitive)
0.7 0.648
Claim 2. In CEDM, if collective judgments should 
track correctness, so as to, say, reflect accurately 
the interests of future generations, then the 
‘technocratic-democratic’ divide can be reconciled 
by a distributed-cognitive system which allows 
specialization and democratic arrangement on 
different premises. 
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